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The Hippias Major is a natural place to look for insight into Plato’s 
aesthetics.1 ‘What is beauty?’ the dialogue asks. What do beautiful things 
all have in common, that warrants their being called ‘beautiful’? Socrates is 
ashamed not to know the answer, so he solicits the expertise of Hippias of 
Elis, the greatest polymath of his day. What follows, however, is bound to 
leave the student of aesthetics quite cold.2 For the beauty Socrates is after 
is not the kind one ﬁnds in a piece of music, or a landscape, or an old town 
square. The Greek noun for ‘beauty’ is to kalon, from the adjective kalos. 
While its use in Homer is predominantly aesthetic, by the classical period 
kalos had become, as one scholar puts it, ‘a blanket term of approbation, 
wider in application than any corresponding English adjective.’3 In the 
Hippias Major alone it applies to everything from quails to customs to 
kitchen utensils, with no clear connotation of aesthetic value. A more 
reliable translation of kalos would be ‘ﬁne’ or ‘admirable’, words which 
better reﬂect the versatility of the Greek.4 In asking after the essence of 
the kalon itself, Socrates wants to know what it is, in the most general way 
imaginable, for a thing to be an object of value. Beauty is only a species 
of value: the kalon ‘in appearance’.5 
 This is not to say that beauty is ignored in the text. A proper account 
of the kalon must explain why beautiful things are indeed beautiful. But 
there is always the question of whether a thing of beauty is genuinely 
kalon. Plato presents us with a striking example of this problem in the 
character of Hippias. His dazzling appearance, encyclopedic knowledge, 
and rhetorical skills have earned him huge sums of money and widespread 
fame, yet there are plenty of reasons to doubt his moral integrity.6 While 
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the portrayal of Hippias is mostly light-hearted, his hypocrisy can be seen 
to have a darker side––as when he boasts about a recent trip to Sparta:7
Just now I made a great impression there speaking about the activities a 
young man should take up. I have a speech about that I put together really 
beautifully, and I put the words particularly well. My setting and the 
starting-point of the speech are something like this: After Troy was taken, 
the tale is told that Neoptolemus asked Nestor what sort of activities are 
kala – the sort of activities that would make someone famous if he adopted 
them while young. After that the speaker is Nestor, who teaches him a very 
great many kala customs. (286a5–b5)
The irony of Hippias’ choice of dramatic setting would not have been 
lost on Plato’s audience. In Greek mythology, Neoptolemus was infamous 
for his atrocities during the aftermath of the war, including the brutal 
murder of Priam, the old Trojan king, at the altar of Zeus Herkeios.8
Hippias has been asked to give the same speech at a schoolroom in 
Athens in two days’ time, and so he invites Socrates to come and judge 
its merits for himself.9 Now is the chance for the expert to be put to the 
test. It so happens that Socrates was recently ridiculed for trying to do 
just that––for ‘ﬁnding fault with parts of some speeches for being aischra 
(‘ugly’ or ‘contemptible’), and praising other parts as kala’ (286c6–7). He 
recounts the episode as follows:
The man questioned me this way, really insultingly: ‘Socrates, how do you 
know what sorts of things are kala and aischra? Look, would you be able 
to say what the kalon is (ti esti to kalon)?’ And I, I’m so worthless, I was 
stuck and I wasn’t able to answer him properly. As I left the gathering I was 
angry and blamed myself, and I made a threatening resolve, that whomever 
of you wise men I met ﬁrst, I would listen and learn and study, then return 
to the questioner and ﬁght the argument back. (286c7 ff.)
Luckily, Socrates now has the famous Hippias alongside to teach 
him ‘what the kalon is itself’ (auto to kalon hoti estin), so that he can avoid 
becoming a ‘laughingstock for having been refuted a second time’ (286d8–
e2). The anonymous questioner is, of course, Socrates’ alter ego; and it is 
Hippias who will be turn out to be the laughingstock. 
For the remainder of the dialogue the two men take up the heckler’s 
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challenge, testing several possible accounts of the kalon. The ﬁrst three 
are offered by Hippias, who, though claiming to understand the question 
(287e2), refuses to give the sort of answer Socrates is after. His proposals—a 
beautiful girl, gold, and a long, illustrious life—are refuted on a variety of 
grounds, yet all display a common weakness. Socrates needs to learn the 
essence of the kalon: the one characteristic of all kala things that is responsible 
for their being kala.10 Hippias has given him only paradigm examples. The 
sophist’s sole aim, it seems, is to make the anonymous questioner appear 
ridiculous (katagelastos: 288b2; 290a1; 292a1): anyone would look absurd 
denying that those things are kala.
Socrates’ own deﬁnitions are of a different ilk and more promising. 
In each case, the kalon is identified with another evaluative concept: 
the appropriate (to prepon), the useful (to chrêsimon), the beneﬁcial (to 
ôphelimon), and auditory and visual pleasure (to di’ akoês te kai di’ opseôs 
hêdu). With his initial three suggestions, Socrates seems to be progressing 
steadily toward a deﬁnition of the kalon in terms of goodness. But when 
his third attempt is defeated by a fallacious argument, he immediately 
changes course and tests a new deﬁnition in terms of aesthetic pleasure. 
It is as though Plato wishes to remind his readers one last time not to 
confuse beauty with the genuinely kalon. The proposal fails for two distinct 
reasons: it cannot account for the kalon in things like laws and actions, and 
it does not say what the two kinds of pleasure (auditory and visual) have 
in common.11 In a last-ditch effort to save the account, Socrates suggests 
that they are both ‘beneﬁcial’. But ‘beneﬁcial pleasure’ is open to the same 
objection as was ‘the beneﬁcial’ only a moment ago. The dialogue ends 
in aporia – for Socrates, if not for Hippias, who is apparently unfazed by 
what has happened.
If the point of the Hippias Major is to get us to look beyond beauty, why 
should it hold any interest for the student of aesthetics? Before offering a 
reason of my own, I shall brieﬂy consider one previous approach to this 
problem. In a 1977 article entitled ‘Plato’s Early Aesthetics: The Hippias 
Major’, David Sider argues that the dialogue can be read ‘as an early 
expression of Plato’s views on aesthetic principles.’12 While fully cognizant 
of the range of meanings that kalos takes on, Sider thinks there is enough in 
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the text about beauty to extract a coherent aesthetic theory. There are many 
points of interest in Sider’s reading of the dialogue, but I shall restrict my 
focus to his central interpretive claim. Sider ﬁnds implicit support for a 
conception of beauty in terms of the harmonious arrangement of parts 
into a uniﬁed whole. Theories linking beauty to harmony and proportion 
were, of course, conventional in classical thought, and there is evidence 
from other dialogues to suggest Plato was attracted to such views.13 But 
on what grounds can we attribute a ‘harmony’ theory of beauty to the 
Plato of the Hippias Major?
 The cornerstone of Sider’s argument appeals to external sources, 
namely what little information we have about the writings of the historical 
Hippias. Sider ﬁnds it ‘highly likely’ that the Hippias Major was partly 
intended as a critique of the ‘lack of artistic order and arrangement’ typical 
of the sophist’s compositions.14 Unfortunately, we know even less about 
the style of Hippias’ writings than we do about their content. We do, 
however, have testimony that Hippias wrote historical and anthropological 
works, including a list of Olympic Victors and a Nomenclature of Tribes.15 
Sider suggests that the ‘genealogies of heroes and men’ (285d6) which 
Hippias says he used to entertain the Spartans were probably of this 
type—that is, mere collections of facts thrown together with little regard for 
narrative form. More important for Sider’s thesis, however, is a fragment 
from the introduction to a work known as the Synagôgê (‘collection’ or 
‘miscellany’):
It may be that some of this has been said by Orpheus, some brieﬂy, here 
and there, by Musaeus, some by Hesiod and some by Homer, some in other 
poets and some in prose-writers both Greek and foreign. For my part, I have 
collected from all these writers what is most important and belongs together 
to make a new and composite work. (Fr. 6; trans, Guthrie.)16
Sider comments: ‘Whether we think of this work as a ﬂorilegium or 
a hodgepodge, it looks as if the items, however intelligently arranged, 
would not form an artistic unity.’17 It is reasonable to suppose that Plato’s 
readers would have known works like the Synagôgê. More contentiously, 
Sider suggests that Plato would have exploited this familiarity in order to 
motivate his own, anti-Hippian, aesthetic ideal. Plato’s dialogue challenges 
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us to seek its own beauty, which ‘must somehow be found in the hidden 
relationship between its elements.’18
While our historical knowledge of Plato’s characters can often be very 
helpful for understanding a dialogue, in this case the evidence is too thin 
to be of much use. In addition to composing the kinds of work mentioned 
above, Hippias was a proliﬁc writer of tragedies and dithyrambs.19 Why 
suppose that his poetic creations displayed a ‘lack of artistic order and 
arrangement’? As a matter of fact, the only reference to his artistic style in 
the dialogue itself weighs against Sider’s view. At 286a5–6, Hippias boasts 
that his epideixis is ‘put together really beautifully (pankalôs sunkeimenos)’. 
Perhaps we are not supposed to take the sophist at his word. We have no 
reason to doubt, however, that Hippias is beautifully dressed. We should 
also assume that his speech really is a work of art. It is another way in 
which his reﬁned appearance hides a contorted soul.
Even if we reject Sider’s suggestion that the Hippias Major was intended 
as a critique of Hippias’ literary style, his more general thesis—that the 
dialogue conceives of beauty in terms of the harmonious arrangement of 
parts into a uniﬁed whole—may still be defensible. Curiously, Sider never 
makes use of the passage which seems to best support his view. That is 
the discussion of Pheidias’ famous state of Athena.
When Hippias’ ﬁrst attempt at a deﬁnition (‘a beautiful girl’) falls 
ﬂat, Socrates kindly clariﬁes the question. The task, he explains, is to 
name ‘the kala itself by which everything else is beautiﬁed and seen to 
be kalon (kosmeitai kai kala phainetai) when that form (eidos) is added to 
it’ (289d2–4). Hippias conveniently ignores the demand for an eidos, a 
‘form’ or ‘characteristic’, and instead exploits an ambiguity in the verb 
kosmeô. Obviously, the answer is gold! ‘Because we all know, don’t we, 
that wherever it is added, even if the thing was seen to be aischron before, 
it will be seen to be kalon when it has been adorned (kosmêthen) with gold’ 
(289e4–6). Hippias’ point is probably that any object is worth more when 
adorned with gold.20 In his refutation, however, Socrates appeals to the 
aesthetic sense of kalos.
Socrates: Well, that answer he [i.e. Socrates’ alter ego] certainly will not 
accept, my friend. And what’s more, he’ll jeer at me, and say, ‘Are you 
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crazy? Do you think Pheidias is a bad craftsman?’ And I think I’ll say, ‘No, 
not at all.’
Hippias: And you’ll be right about that.
Socrates: Right enough. Then when I agree that Pheidias is a good 
craftsman, this person will say, ‘Next, do you think Pheidias didn’t know 
about this kalon you mention?’ ‘What’s the point?’ I’ll say. ‘The point is,’ 
he’ll say, ‘that Pheidias didn’t make Athena’s eyes out of gold, nor the rest of 
her face, nor her feet, nor her hands—as he would have done if gold would 
really have made them be seen to be most beautiful—but he made them out 
of ivory. Apparently he went wrong through ignorance; he didn’t know gold 
was what made everything beautiful, wherever it is added.’ What shall we 
answer when he says that, Hippias?
Hippias: It’s not hard. We’ll say he made the statue right. Ivory’s beautiful 
too, I think.
Socrates: ‘Then why didn’t he work the middles of the eyes out of ivory? He 
used stone, and he found stone that resembled ivory as closely as possible. 
Isn’t a stone a beautiful thing too, if it’s a beautiful one?’ Shall we agree?
Hippias: Yes, at least when it’s appropriate.
Socrates: ‘But when it’s not appropriate it’s ugly?’ Do I agree or not?
Hippias: ‘Yes, when it’s not appropriate anyway.
Socrates: ‘Well,’ he’ll say. ‘You’re a wise man! Don’t ivory and gold make 
things be seen to be beautiful when they’re appropriate, but ugly when 
they’re not?’ Shall we be negative? Or shall we agree with him that he’s 
right?
Hippias: We’ll agree to this: whatever is appropriate to each thing makes 
that particular thing beautiful. (290a2–d6)
Gold does not make a statue beautiful ‘wherever it is added’, but 
only where it is appropriate. The same is true of ivory and stone, and 
anything else Pheidias might have used. Hippias seems to draw the right 
conclusion: ‘whatever is appropriate to each thing makes that particular 
thing beautiful.’21 The example of the Athena shows that gold cannot be 
the kalon for two distinct reasons. First, adding gold to something might 
instead make it uglier: set next to Pheidias’ masterpiece, an Athena with 
golden eyes and golden skin would look absurd. Second, other stuff 
besides gold (e.g. ivory) can make a thing beautiful. But the kalon itself, 
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whatever it is, is both responsible for the beauty in all beautiful things, 
and can never be seen to make a thing ugly.
A good sculptor like Pheidias does not simply know what materials to 
use, but how to use them appropriately. Whether a certain artistic choice 
is appropriate, moreover, depends on the aim of the work as a whole. A 
parallel passage from the start of Republic IV makes this last point clear. 
Socrates explains to Adeimantus that, as creators of the ideal city, they 
should not aim to make only a few of its citizens happy (i.e., the guardian 
class), but instead to have ‘the whole city’ be as happy as possible (420b5–
6). He then goes on to draw an analogy (420c4–d4):
Imagine we were putting the colours on a statue of a man, and someone 
came along and told us we were doing it wrong, since we weren’t using the 
most beautiful colours for the most beautiful parts of the living creature. 
The eyes, the most beautiful feature, had been coloured black, not purple. 
We would regard it as a quite reasonable defense to say to him: ‘Hang on a 
minute. You surely don’t think, do you, that we should make the eyes—or 
any of the other parts of the body—so beautiful that they don’t even look like 
eyes. The thing to ask yourself is whether by giving the appropriate colours 
to everything (ta prosêkonta hekastois apodidontes) we are making the 
whole thing beautiful (to holon kalon).
Here Plato uses the participial adjective prosêkôn instead of prepôn, but 
the thought is exactly the same as in the Pheidias passage. The painter’s 
aim is to make the whole statue beautiful (perhaps when viewed from 
a certain distance), and his decisions about how to deal with individual 
parts must be subordinated to that end.22
The discussion of the Athena Parthenos, ﬂeshed out by Republic IV, 
appears to support Sider’s thesis that the Hippias Major sees beauty in 
terms of unity and harmony. An object is not beautiful simply in virtue of 
having beautiful parts; it makes all of the difference whether those parts 
are arranged to create a beautiful whole. But even if Sider is right on that 
score, I believe the Pheidias passage can be seen to suggest a far more 
interesting aesthetic theory.
We have seen that gold, ivory, and stone make a thing beautiful or 
ugly, depending on the context in which it appears.23 Hippias does not 
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want to accept this, however, since it implies that gold and ivory are really 
no more beautiful than stone.24 Socrates must give a separate argument 
before Hippias is forced to (silently) concede that gold is no more kalos 
than wood from a ﬁgtree (291c7–8). Why does Socrates keep insisting on 
these strange sounding claims? One would think that even if gold can 
sometimes be ugly, it is more beautiful than ordinary stone ‘on the whole’ 
(cf. 288e6). But that is not Socrates’ position. For him, since neither gold 
nor stone is always beautiful, it would be wrong to say that one property 
is more kalos than the other.
By provocatively putting gold and stone on an equal plain with respect 
to beauty, Socrates invites us to ask whether we can push the point further. 
Does every property behave like gold and stone? Or, on the contrary, do 
some properties always make things beautiful, while others always make 
things ugly? This is the dispute between ‘holists’ and ‘atomists’ about the 
nature of aesthetic reasons.
An aesthetic reason is any consideration that supports an aesthetic 
judgment. In the normal case, an aesthetic reason will cite some feature of 
the thing being judged. For example, if I wanted to defend my admiration 
for a particular performance of the ‘Hammerklavier’ sonata, I might point 
out the sense of urgency in the opening bars. Here ‘urgency’ is the feature 
cited as a reason for my approval. In another context, however, a sense 
of urgency might ruin a piece—for example in the ﬁnale of the ‘Tempest’ 
sonata. So a property like urgency has no inherent valence in the domain 
of aesthetic judgment. The kind of aesthetic reason it furnishes, for or 
against, varies according to context. Holism is the thesis that all aesthetic 
reasons are variant, because any ‘feature that in one place adds something 
of aesthetic value may in another make things worse’.25 (In still another 
place the same feature may make no evaluative difference at all.) Atomism 
is the view that certain features keep their valence irrespective of context, 
so some aesthetic reasons must be invariant.26
The holism-atomism distinction is central to the debate between 
‘particularists’ and ‘generalists’ about aesthetic judgment.27 Broadly 
speaking, the particularist holds that the rationality of aesthetic judgment 
does not depend on the truth of any principles. (Generalists deny this.) 
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Aesthetic principles come in two varieties: ‘absolute’ and ‘contributory’.28 
An absolute principle speciﬁes some feature and states that whenever 
that feature is present, there is overall reason to admire/condemn the 
object which bears it. A contributory principle makes a weaker claim: the 
speciﬁed feature gives us some reason to admire/condemn the object which 
bears it, in so far as it is present. But that reason may be counteracted by 
other considerations. Thus a generalist might think that ‘unity’ always 
gives us a reason to admire a work of art, while allowing that many uniﬁed 
works are condemnable overall.
Arguments for aesthetic particularism are often based on a holistic 
theory of reasons. Thus in a classic statement of the particularist position, 
Mary Mothersill writes: ‘There is no characteristic which is amenable to 
independent explanation [of its value] and which by its presence enhances 
the aesthetic value [of an artwork].’29 If that is right, then there is also no 
characteristic that could be speciﬁed in an aesthetic principle, absolute 
or contributory. We are left with two alternatives: either the rationality 
of aesthetic judgment does not depend on principles, or else aesthetic 
evaluation is arbitrary (‘the result of personal whim’30). Finding no 
grounds for supposing the latter, Mothersill concludes that reasonable 
criticism has no need for ‘aesthetic norms’.31 Generalists also want to 
preserve the rationality of aesthetic judgment, so their best option will 
be to attack holism. (I should note that the particularist need not follow 
Mothersill and insist that there are no invariant reasons, as long as he can 
show that invariance is itself strictly irrelevant to a reason’s normative 
force.)
We need not enter any deeper into the debate between generalists 
and particularists to consider where Plato might stand with respect to 
the issues it raises. I shall argue that the Pheidias passage in the Hippias 
Major, taken in conjunction with passages from the Phaedo and Republic, 
supports a holistic conception of aesthetic reasons. I do not, however, 
think this gives us sufﬁcient warrant to interpret Plato as an aesthetic 
particularist, for reasons I shall explain. 
Let us begin with what seems least controversial. Socrates appeals to the 
Athena of Pheidias to show that gold (as well as ivory and stone) can make 
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something either beautiful or ugly, depending on how it is used. Hippias 
had given his deﬁnition in the form of an absolute principle: for any object, 
he claims, ‘even if it was seen to be aischron before, it will be seen to be kalon 
when it has been beautiﬁed with gold’ (289e5–6). Any example of a gold 
thing which is nonetheless foul would have been a sufﬁcient refutation. (A 
badly designed statue is not made beautiful by applying a coat of gold.) 
Instead, Socrates gives a hypothetical example in which the addition of 
gold itself would have made something worse. He thereby undermines the 
weaker, contributory version of Hippias’ principle, which says that gold 
makes things beautiful in so far as it is present. So there is no suggestion 
in this passage that gold always adds some aesthetic value, which may 
then be outweighed by other considerations. On the contrary—Socrates 
argues that gold is no more beautiful than stone, since neither is inherently 
beautiful. Here, at least, gold, ivory, and stone are treated in the manner 
of the holist, as were colours in the Republic IV passage.32
Does the Hippias Major therefore allow us to read Plato as a holist? Now 
is when we need to start using caution. For everything we have seen so far 
is consistent with an atomistic theory. Remember: the atomist only insists 
that some aesthetic reasons are invariant. Purple is sometimes beautiful and 
at other times ugly, but that could be due to some deeper invariant truth 
about the proper use of colour. So the question to ask is whether Socrates’ 
analysis of purple and gold can be extended to other properties.
Unfortunately, the Hippias Major will not provide any answers. Once 
the Athena Parthenos has performed her task, Socrates quickly moves 
on to other matters. The only relevant statement we ﬁnd is Hippias’ 
remark: ‘whatever is appropriate to each thing makes that particular thing 
beautiful.’ But that does not exclude the possibility that certain properties 
are always appropriate—and therefore make things beautiful—wherever 
they appear. The text simply has nothing to say on this issue. In order 
to further pursue the question of Plato’s holism, we will have to look to 
other dialogues for help.  
The ﬁrst relevant passage comes at Phaedo 100c,33 after Socrates recounts 
his youthful disillusionment with the physicists. Anaxagoras’ theory had 
purported to explain the universe in terms of Mind (nous), but instead 
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gave only material causes (aitiai): ‘air and ether and water any many other 
strange things’ (98c1–2). Socrates quips: ‘That seemed to me much like 
saying that Socrates’ actions are all due to his mind, and then in trying to 
tell the causes of everything I do, to say that the reason that I am sitting 
here is because my body consists of bones and sinews’ (98c2–8). These 
‘bones and sinews’ could have just as easily carried him off to Megara. 
What really caused Socrates to stay and face his death was nothing but 
his ‘belief as to what is best’ (99a1–2). The theories of Anaxagoras and 
others gave only necessary conditions of events, failing ‘to distinguish the 
real cause (to aition tôi onti) from that without which the cause would not 
be able to act as a cause’ (99b2–4). A ‘real cause’, according to Socrates, 
would explain why something is for the best, which ultimately depends 
on an account of ‘the common good for all’ (98b2–3).
Socrates never found the grand teleological explanation he was after, 
so he chose to embark on a ‘second voyage’ (99d1) of causal discovery. 
That is his famous ‘method of hypothesis’, the difﬁculties of which we can 
thankfully set to one side. What matters for the present argument is the 
notion of a ‘safe’ cause, which Socrates illustrates through the example of 
the kalon. He begins by assuming the existence of ‘a kalon itself by itself (ti 
kalon auto kath’ auto)’ (100b6)—the very thing investigated in the Hippias 
Major.34 In the absence of a teleological account, Socrates believes, the best 
explanation for why something is beautiful will simply refer to the kalon. 
Here is the crucial passage (100c4–e3):
It seems to me that, if there is anything beautiful besides the kalon itself, it 
is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that kalon (itself) […]. 
I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated (sophas) 
causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a 
bright colour or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for 
all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to 
this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the 
sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that kalon we 
mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but 
that all beautiful things are beautiful by the kalon (itself) (tôi kalôi panta 
ta kala kala). That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone 
else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the safe 
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answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through the kalon 
(itself) that beautiful things are made beautiful.
The ‘sophisticated’ causes that Socrates rejects are of the order of 
Hippias’ claim that gold is what makes things beautiful. Why does he deny 
that colours and shapes can be genuine causes of beauty, and rely on his 
safe cause instead? The answer, we may infer, is that colours and shapes 
are like bones and sinews. Just as Socrates’ bones and sinews could have 
helped him ﬂee to Megara, the colours and shapes of a beautiful object 
could have been used to make something ugly. There must be something 
further which explains why one possibility was realized and not the other. 
In Socrates’ case, it was his belief about the best thing to do. In the case of 
beautiful objects, however, the best answer Socrates thinks he can give is 
‘the kalon itself’. The precise relationship between the kalon itself and all 
of the many beautiful things is left unspeciﬁed. It is more important to 
Socrates that he ‘never fall into error’ by confusing the genuine cause of 
beauty with something it is not.
 How does the Phaedo passage add to what we gathered from the 
Hippias Major? There we found Plato treating gold and ivory as a holist 
would, and the question was whether that analysis could be generalized. 
Now in the Phaedo Socrates denies that any ‘bright colour or shape or any 
such thing’ could be a genuine cause of beauty, and the reason seems to 
be that none of these is by its nature such as to make things beautiful. To 
see this last point better, let us turn to what Socrates says about the ‘more 
reﬁned’ type of cause introduced at Phaedo 103e. The completely safe 
account of why an object is hot is that it shares in the form of the hot (or 
‘the hot itself’). But Socrates believes that a somewhat more informative 
answer can be given, namely that ﬁre makes it hot. Why does he think 
that? Because ﬁre is by its very nature hot: it cannot become cold and still 
be ﬁre. ‘Fire, as the cold approaches, will either go away or be destroyed; 
it will never venture to admit coldness and remain what it was, ﬁre and 
cold’ (103d10–12). Thus ﬁre will make things hot in so far as it is present. 
It is among the things that ‘is not the form but always has its character 
(morphên) wherever it exists’ (103e4–5). That is why Socrates is comfortable 
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naming ﬁre as a cause of hotness, in addition to the hot itself: ‘If you should 
ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would be that 
safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides 
a more reﬁned (kompsoteran) answer, namely, ﬁre […]’ (105b8–c2). The 
key question for our purposes, then, is whether Plato believes there is an 
analog to ﬁre in the case of beauty. Is there any property that will always 
make an object beautiful in so far as it is present, and which by its very 
nature can never be ugly?35
We ﬁnd nothing in the text of the Phaedo to suggest that there is such 
a property. The only cause of beauty mentioned is the kalon itself. To my 
mind, that is a good reason to suppose that Plato did not think a ‘more 
reﬁned’ cause could be found. Before we conclude that he was a holist, 
however, it would be better to have some positive evidence that Plato 
believed nothing apart from the kalon itself was of its nature beautiful. 
For that we can turn to Republic V, where Socrates discusses the lovers of 
sights and sounds.
Socrates introduces the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ (philêkooi kai 
philotheamones) towards the end of Republic V as a foil for the philosophers—
the men and women who will be called upon to rule Kallipolis. The lovers 
of sights and sounds could easily be confused for philosophers, since they 
appear to take great pleasure in learning: ‘They behave as if they had 
rented out their ears to listen to every chorus they can ﬁnd. So they do 
their round of the festivals of Dionysus, never missing one, either in town 
or country’ (475d4–8). But unlike true philosophers, they take pleasure 
in ‘beautiful things (kala pragmata)’ (476c1)—‘beautiful sounds, colours, 
shapes, and everything which is created from these things (ta ek tôn toioutôn 
dêmiourgoumena)’—with minds that are ‘incapable of seeing, and taking 
pleasure in, the nature of the kalon itself’ (476b5–7). In fact, the lover of 
sights and sounds does not even believe in such a thing; it is as though his 
life were a dream (476c1–3). The philosopher, by contrast, who believes 
in the kalon itself, ‘can look both at it and at the things which share in it 
without mistaking them for it or it for them’ (476c7–d1).
We have encountered the lover of sights and sounds before: he is the 
purveyor of ‘sophisticated’ causes in the Phaedo; or Hippias when he 
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refuses to give an account of the kalon, and instead names beautiful things 
like ivory and gold.36 In the conversation that follows, Socrates argues 
that the lover of sights and sounds cannot have knowledge (epistemê) of 
the things he admires, but only opinion (doxa). That is because the proper 
object of knowledge is ‘what is’ (to on), but the many beautiful things take 
up ‘an intermediate position between what purely and simply is something 
and what is not something in any way at all’ (478d6–7). The explanation 
for this latter claim comes at 478e7–479b2, when Socrates says:
I have a question to put to that ﬁne fellow who does not believe in the kalon 
itself,  a form or character of the kalon which remains always the same and 
unchanging, who thinks that the kalon is plural – that born spectator who 
cannot tolerate anyone saying that the kalon is one […]: ‘Well, my friend,’ 
we shall ask him, ‘is there any of these many beautiful things which cannot 
on occasion appear ugly? […]’ No. They must necessarily appear to be both 
beautiful and ugly.
The many beautiful things cannot be objects of knowledge because they 
both are and are not beautiful, while the form of the kalon itself ‘remains 
always the same and unchanging’.
There is a long-standing debate over whether ‘the many beautiful 
things’ (ta polla kala) are meant to be particulars or universals.37 When 
the lovers of sights and sounds are introduced, however, Socrates clearly 
has both in mind: ‘sounds, colours, shapes’ (universals), and ‘everything 
created out of these things’ (particulars). My argument requires only that 
ta polla kala at least include universals. This much is secured just a few 
lines later, when Socrates says: ‘So we have discovered, apparently, that 
most people’s varying standards (ta polla nomima) of beauty and things 
like that are rattling around somewhere in the middle, between what is 
not something and what purely and simply is something’ (479d2–4). By 
nomima, Socrates must have in mind commonplace views about what 
properties make particular things beautiful, just like the ‘sophisticated’ 
causes of the Phaedo, and Hippias’ claim about gold.38 But this time Socrates 
is unequivocal: there is not one of these many properties which will not at 
some point turn out to be ugly.39 As Socrates says about the many doubles, 
‘each of them can always lay claim to both labels’ (479b7).
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All of this conﬁrms what was implicit in the Phaedo and suggested 
in the Hippias Major. In Plato’s scheme, there is no parallel to ﬁre when 
it comes to beauty—no property that brings beauty with it wherever it 
goes.40 If a property appears beautiful in a certain context, that is never 
due to the nature of the property; it becomes beautiful only by sharing in 
the form of the kalon itself. I think we are justiﬁed, then, in reading Plato as 
a holist about aesthetic reasons. The key insight of the Hippias Major was 
that gold can make a statue either beautiful or ugly, depending on how 
it is used. In the Phaedo and Republic, the analysis is extended to include 
all aesthetically relevant properties. We may also safely conclude that he 
would be opposed to aesthetic principles, absolute or contributory. Since 
the valence of any property is always in ﬂux, no principle could ever be 
trusted.41 
So far Plato’s view would appear to have all the marks of particularism. 
As I understand him, however, Plato parts ways with the particularist at 
a critical juncture. Aesthetic particularism, we recall, was the claim that 
the rationality of aesthetic judgment does not depend on the truth of any 
principles. In other words, the practice of aesthetic evaluation can get along 
just ﬁne without being grounded in any invariant norms. But is that not 
exactly what the dialogues deny? The lovers of sights and sounds are said 
to be mired in lowly opinion because they have not seen the form of the 
kalon. They are in the same state as the Socrates of the Hippias Major, who 
rashly judged the beauty of speeches before knowing ‘what the kalon is 
itself’. The aesthetic particularist, on the other hand, would be not at all 
troubled by his inability to give an account of beauty. It does not ﬁgure into 
his picture of how aesthetic value works. The particularist stance is perhaps 
best captured by Hippias’ words: ‘whatever is appropriate to each thing 
makes that particular thing beautiful.’ There is nothing more to be said 
about why a particular object is beautiful than that certain of its properties 
make it beautiful in this particular case.42 The particularist does not appeal 
to something further, beauty, which explains why those properties make 
the thing beautiful. Thus a deﬁnition of beauty would be otiose. 
So what is to be gained by insisting that the real cause of a thing’s 
aesthetic value is ‘beauty itself’? In an eloquent defense of the Platonic 
The Hippias Major and Aesthetics
L&A 2009.1.indd   46 9/9/09   8:49:06 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 19 (1) June 2009, page 47 
view, David Sedley writes:
There is an enormous value in knowing that the sunset is beautiful 
because of the beautiful and not because of, say, its colour. Only when 
you know what the genuine cause is do you know what it is that you have 
to investigate. If you want to understand what makes sunsets beautiful, 
don’t be sidetracked into investigating the nature of colours. Investigate 
what the beautiful is – in other words, seek to establish the essence of the 
beautiful by means of a deﬁnition.43
I am not sure that I agree. Investigating the nature of colours and 
seeking to establish the essence of beauty are not the only available 
options. If I wanted to understand what makes sunsets beautiful, the best 
thing I could do would be to observe a lot of sunsets. I could then make 
comparisons based on these experiences, and draw up some tentative 
generalizations about what the beautiful ones have in common. 
At the end of the Hippias Major, Socrates can only conclude that the 
kalon is difﬁcult. There is little reason to believe that having a deﬁnition 
would make it any easier to say why a thing is beautiful. The value in the 
Platonic notion of the beautiful is not, as far as I can see, that it inspires 
us toward abstract reﬂection. It reminds us, rather, that beauty is elusive, 
and will always resist being contained in rules and formulae. We can 
only hope to develop our sensibilities, so that we may recognize beauty 
when it appears.44
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Notes
1  For those who accept the work as genuine, that is. The Hippias Major is one of a very small 
number of Platonic dialogues whose authenticity is still debated by scholars. Cf. Woodruff, 1982 
and Kahn, 1985. For an exhaustive history of the debate, see Liminta, 1998:3–28. If Plato himself 
did not write the Hippias Major, then the author was deeply familiar with Plato’s dialogues and 
strove to maintain consistency with the rest of the corpus. Thus Charles Kahn, who has led the 
charge of spuriousness in recent decades, concedes that ‘no serious philosophical harm will be 
done to scholars and students who take the work for Platonic, so cleverly has the author done his 
job’ (269).
2  Cf. Woodruff, 1982: ‘The Hippias Major is […] not a treatise in aesthetics, and beauty is not its 
subject’ (110). For most of its history, the dialogue appears to have been treated rather differently. 
For example, we ﬁnd an original translation and analysis of the work appended to the second 
edition of Jean-Pierre de Crousaz’s Traité du Beau (1724; orig. 1714), one of the founding works 
of modern French aesthetics. Crousaz considered this the best way to educate his readers about 
‘les idées de Socrate sur le Beau’ (Calle and Bonet, 2001:45, n. 26). Likewise, Dorothy Tarrant, the 
author of the ﬁrst English commentary on the dialogue, claims that it was written primarily ‘from 
the aesthetic point of view’ (1928:xiv). See also Grube, 1927.
3  Dodds, 1959:249.
4  It is true that ‘beautiful’ enjoys a similar versatility (see chapter one of Scruton, 2009), but a strict 
substitution for kalos yields some awkward results (e.g., ‘the beautiful pot, full of beautiful bean 
soup’ (290d8–9)). In what follows I shall stick with the Greek term for the more general uses of 
kalos (including ‘the kalon itself’), reserving the word ‘beautiful’ for when the sense is clearly 
aesthetic. 
5  Cf. Moravcsik, 1982:31.
6  Consider, for example, the passage at 282a1 ff., where Socrates suggests that the seven sages 
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have nothing on the modern man of learning. Hippias heartily agrees, then adds: ‘However I 
usually praise the ancients who came before us before and more highly than I praise people of 
our own day, for while I take care to avoid the envy of the living, I fear the wrath of the dead’. 
‘How beautifully, Hippias, you’re putting your thoughts into words!’ Socrates replies (282b1–2). 
Hippias’ little speech, full of rhyme, repetition, and antithesis, is a model of Gorgianic ﬂoridness. 
But it is also a shameless admission of deceit.
7  Translations are taken from Cooper, 1997 (with minor alterations) with the exception of the 
Republic passages, which are from Ferrari, 2000 (trans. Grifﬁth).
8  He is also said to have hurled Hector’s son, Astyanax, from the walls of Troy, before abducting his 
mother, Andromache, as a concubine. It is also signiﬁcant that the young Neoptolemus is seeking 
the advice of someone who is not his father (Achilles having been slain in battle); cf. 283e ff.    
9  This is very likely the same speech referred to at the start of the Hippias Minor.
10  See Sedley, 1998 for the suggestion that a Platonic cause is a ‘thing responsible’. 
11  Cf. Janaway, 1995:66.
12  Sider, 1977:466.
13  Cf. Grube, 1927:275–77.
14  Sider, 1977: 467–68. Cf. Sider, 1992: ‘kalon entails a unity that is foreign to Hippias’ method of 
composition.’
15  Guthrie, 1971:282.
16  Guthrie, 1971:283.
17  Sider, 1977:468.
18  Sider, 1992.
19  Guthrie, 1971:283.
20  Cf. 289e1–2.
21  It should be noted that the word prepôn is more strongly positive than our ‘appropriate’, which 
can mean simply ‘not inappropriate’.
22  One could argue that ‘deal with each part appropriately’ just means ‘make each part the colour 
it is in nature’. But the reason for painting naturalistically, I take it, is to make ‘the whole thing 
beautiful’.  
23  I should note here that Plato treats ‘making a thing beautiful/ugly’ as tantamount to ‘being 
beautiful/ugly’.
24  Note the limiting force of the particle ge in Hippias’ statement: ‘We’ll agree to this (ge): whatever 
is appropriate to each thing makes that particular thing beautiful.’ Hippias is unwilling to draw 
the second half of the conclusion: ‘…and whatever is not appropriate to each thing makes that 
particular thing worse.’
25  Dancy, 2004:76.
26  Beardsley (1958) argues for exactly three such features: unity, complexity, and intensity.
27  My account of particularism is largely based on Dancy, 2008. Bender, 1995 adds complications to 
the story, but I cannot address them in this space.
28  Dancy, 2008.
29  Mothersill, 1961:77.
30  Mothersill, 1961:76.
31  Mothersill, 1961:78. It is interesting to note that Mothersill assumes generalism must be true in 
the moral domain. The reason seems to be that she thinks moral cases are sufﬁciently similar to 
support principles, whereas individual works of art are more unique. 
32  In the Republic IV passage, Socrates calls purple ‘the most beautiful colour’. But that is compatible 
with holism. I may ﬁnd that the sound of a clarinet is more beautiful than the sound of a ﬂute, but 
that does not commit me to the view that a clarinet always makes music beautiful in so far as it is 
present. 
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33  It has been suggested that both passages I shall draw on for my argument assume familiarity with 
the Hippias Major (cf. Woodruff, 1982:54–55). Nothing I have to say exploits that possibility.
34  Cf. HiMa. 287c8–d2, where Socrates again ‘assumes the existence’ of the ﬁne itself. The dative 
construction also appears in the Phaedo passage. Cf. Symp. 211b1–3. 
35  The presence of this property would not guarantee that an object is ﬁne. Similarly, a pot of boiling 
water poured into the ocean does not make the ocean hot.
36  Cf. Janaway, 1995:109.
37  The classic defense of the ‘universals’ reading is Gosling, 1960. Sedley, 2007 appears to treat them 
as particulars.
38  Cf. Gosling, 1960:120. For other uses of nomima in the Republic, cf. 425a8; 479d4; 484d2; 589c7. A 
nominon attributed to Simonides is the centerpiece of Republic I: ‘it is just to pay everyone what is 
owed to him’ (331e3–4).
39  Janaway, 1995 has a different take on why the many ﬁne properties always turn out to be foul: 
‘The things which have one of these properties are and are not beautiful—meaning that some 
gold things are beautiful, some are not, some brightly coloured things are beautiful, some are not’ 
(109). On my interpretation, however, it is gold and bright colours themselves which make things 
beautiful and not beautiful.
40  This might be true for Plato’s scheme only through the Republic. Phil. 51b seems to tell a different 
story, though I am not sure.
41  At this point it might be said that I have passed over a serious objection to my argument. The 
Pheidias passage suggests that there is a property that always makes things ﬁne, namely ‘the 
appropriate’ (to prepon). The appropriate explains why gold, ivory, and stone created a beautiful 
Athena. It would seem, then, that the appropriate does for the ﬁne what ﬁre does for the hot. And 
wouldn’t that make Plato an atomist about aesthetic reasons? No. Consider what it means to say 
that the use of a particular colour on a statue is ‘appropriate’. The only good answer, it seems to 
me, is that it makes the statue more beautiful. But if that is correct, then ‘the appropriate’ no more 
explains why Pheidias’ statue is beautiful than does ‘beauty itself’.
42  That is not quite all that the particularist can say. He can explain why the same property is ﬁne-
making here and foul-making there by pointing to other properties which make the two cases 
different. But he still makes no appeal to ﬁneness itself.
43  Sedley, 1998:127.
44  I wish to thank the Graduate Studies Executive Committee of the Department of Philosophy 
at UT-Austin for a summer scholarship which supported the writing of this article. The line of 
thought in this paper owes much to Paul Woodruff, whose Spring 2007 seminar on the Forms 
sparked my interest in the theme of holism/particularism in Plato. I also would like to thank Rick 
Benitez for inviting me to contribute to the present volume, and for his comments on the original 
draft.
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